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This study examines the propagation mechanism of economic policy uncertainty 
shocks within Greece and between Greece and Europe over the period of January, 
1998 and May, 2018. Further insights about the Greek-internal and external dynam-
ics of economic policy uncertainty are provided by employing the recently developed 
dynamic connectedness decomposition approach of Gabauer and Gupta (2018). Our 
analysis reveals that Greek economic policy uncertainty is dominating the European 
economic policy uncertainty nearly permanently throughout the period of analysis. 
In particular, the Greek banking policy uncertainty (capital controls) and Greek 
currency policy uncertainty (Grexit rumours) have been significant net pairwise 
transmitters with respect to the European economic policy uncertainty. In addi-
tion, the Greek-internal transmission mechanism indicates that, Greek fiscal policy 
uncertainty indices are driven by Greek related monetary policy indices. Finally, 
our impulse response analysis suggests that the persistence of monetary policy re-
lated shocks is varying over time and increased after the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-2009. This magnifying e↵ect explains partially the prolonged recovery of the 
European economy.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, when the global economy was
still reeling, recovery in Europe was delayed due to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
(2010). While, the main root of this Eurozone crisis was in Greece, countries like Cyprus,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain also had a role to play. These countries would have
been unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks
under their national supervision without the assistance of other Eurozone countries, the
European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The detailed causes of the European governmental debt crisis still tend to vary and
to be interconnected. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble
were transferred to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government
responses to slowing economies post-bubble. The structure of the eurozone as a currency
union without fiscal union is believed to have contributed to the crisis and limited the
ability of European leaders to respond. At the same time, European banks also tend to
own a significant amount of sovereign debt, resulting in concerns regarding the solvency
of banking systems, which in turn deepened the crisis.
The slow recovery of European countries and the aforementioned factors raised ques-
tions regarding the stability of the European currency union. Alesina et al. (1996); Chen
and Feng (1996); Jong-A-Pin (2009) and Aisen and Veiga (2013) find that an increase in
a country’s political instability slows down its economic growth. Based on this linkage,
this study tries to answer whether Greece has been the dominant driver of European
political uncertainty and hence slowed down the European economic recovery or whether
the European political uncertainty caused slow economic growth in Greece. To answer
this question, we are analyzing the uncertainty transmission mechanism between Europe
and Greece.
However, we are not the first who are interested in the spillovers and multiplier effects
across uncertainties to explain economic performance. This field of research is already an
important line in economics. Among others Castelnuovo et al. (2017); Gupta et al. (2019,
2018) and Antonakakis et al. (2018) have found that the uncertainties across economies
are indeed interrelated. This means that, the overall domestic uncertainty is not only
influenced by its within policy-related uncertainties, but also by external uncertainty
spillovers. Note that understanding a country’s uncertainty tranmission mechanism re-
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quires to differentiate between its internal and external policy uncertainty propagation
processes. Thus, by taking into account both parts of the tranmsission mechanism, the di-
rect and indirect (through the international feedback loop) impacts of uncertainty shocks
can be evaluated. Keep in mind that a shock’s prolonged effects are caused by the ex-
ternal spillovers magnified by the international feedback loop. This knowledge is of great
importance for policy makers especially since it helps to create an ’early-warning system’
(Diebold and Yılmaz, 2012) which allows to mitigate the adverse effects of spillovers by
adjusting different political instruments. However, it is also essential to know which form
of uncertainty plays a more dominant role (Mumtaz and Surico, 2018).
While studies like Ajmi et al. (2014); Biljanovska et al. (2017); Caggiano et al. (2017);
Colombo (2013); Klößner and Sekkel (2014), and Yin and Han (2014) focus on the trans-
mission mechanism of international economic policy uncertainty, others investigate uncer-
tainty spillovers within the sovereign debt markets (see for example, Antonakakis et al.,
2018; Apergis and Cooray, 2014; De Santis et al., 2018). However, the main focus so
far is grounded on the investigation of country-level uncertainty propagation mechanism.
Only recently Gabauer and Gupta (2018) analyze the uncertainty dynamics on a more
granular level by examining categorical economic policy uncertainty spillovers between
the US and Japan. In more detail, the employed categorical economic policy uncertainty
indices have been monetary, fiscal, trade and currency policy uncertainty. This line of
research gives further insights in the country-internal and external tranmission mecha-
nism and provides us with further information about the international feedback loop, its
magnification effect and the persistence of shocks across all analyzed countries in the net-
work. This concept paired with the recently provided set of Greek categorical economic
policy uncertainty indices (Hardouvelis et al., 2018) allows us to analyze the uncertainty
transmission mechanism between Europe and Greece.
We believe that the investigation of the Greek country-internal and external uncer-
tainty propagation mechanism and its impact on the European economy as a whole is of
major importance for policy makers and to the best of our knowledge not examined so
far. The estimated uncertainty propagation mechanism between Greece and Europe will
reveal the transmitter of shocks and hence who is slowing down which economic recov-
ery. In the case of Greece, we employ the recently developed Greek categorical economic
policy uncertainty indices which will give us a more granular and detailed insight in the
underyling uncertainty dynamics. The employed Greek categorical economic policy un-
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certainty series are related to the sovereign debt, banking, currency, tax, pension fund,
and monetary policy. This examination should provide us with the following informa-
tion: (i) whether the European economy or Greece is the net transmitter of uncertainty
shocks, (ii) what is the direction and the impact of the Greek categorical economic policy
uncertainty shocks, and (iii) how persistent particular uncertainty shocks are.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that attempts to examine the
uncertainty spillovers of various types of uncertainties within Greece and Europe, by tak-
ing advantage of the newly developed connectedness decomposition approach by Gabauer
and Gupta (2018) which allows the calculation of country-internal and external transmis-
sion processes. Important to note is that this approach is an extension of the fully-fledged
time-varying parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) connectedness approach of An-
tonakakis and Gabauer (2017) which in turn is based on the well-known dynamic con-
nectedness approach of Diebold and Yılmaz (2014). Our chosen approach refines the
measures of the initially proposed framework in many respects, since there is no need to
arbitrarily set the rolling-window size, there is no loss of observations, and the results are
not sensitive to outliers. Overall, this rather complex estimation procedure is chosen to
estimate the time-varying internal and external tranmission mechanisms between Greece
and Europe which will reveal whether the dynamics across the employed series are stable
or influenced through the Global Financial Crisis or the European governmental debt
crisis.
The results of our empirical analysis reveal that the economic policy uncertainty be-
tween Greece and Europe is bidirectional and that Greece is nearly throughout the whole
sample the net transmitter of uncertainty. This can be explained in more detail by looking
on the categorical level where we find that the Greek currency uncertainty and monetary
uncertainty spillovers are net pairwise transmitter with respect to the European economic
policy uncertainty. On the opposite, we find that the Greek pension uncertainty and Greek
debt uncertainty are net receivers of shocks with respect to European economic policy un-
certainty. However, the country-internal transmission mechanism reveals the fiscal policy
uncertainty is overshadowed by shocks related monetary policy which explains why on
the aggregated level the shocks have been transmitter from Greece to Europe. Finally,
the impulse response analysis illustrates that monetary policy related uncertainty shocks
are more persistent during the time of economic turmoils such as the Global Financial
Crisis and the European governmental debt crisis.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and
the empirical methodology. The empirical results of our analysis are presented in Section
3, while Section 4 concludes the study.
2 Data & Methodology
The dataset consists of monthly news-based economic policy uncertainty indices (EPU).
The European economic policy uncertainty index (EEPU) is based on the work of Baker
et al. (2016) whereas the Greek categorical EPU are provided by Hardouvelis et al. (2018)
and cover banking (EPUB), currency (EPUC), taxes (EPUT), debt (EPUD), pension
(EPUP), and monetary policy (EPUM). These indices rest on newspaper searches with
term sets related to economy, policy and uncertainty. Our data1 spans over the period
from January, 1998 to May, 2018.
In Figure 1, the raw EPU indices are visualized whereby certain amount of uncertainty
co-movements of country-specific categorical uncertainty can be observed. Since, nearly
all raw series of EPU are non-stationary, we use annual percentage changes, yit = log(xit)−
log(xit−12) as illustrated in Figure 2.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here]
Table 1 shows that all transformed series are significantly positively skewed, leptokur-
tic, not normally distributed, and stationary on the 1% significance level. Furthermore,
all series are significantly autocorrelated on the 1% significance level and four out of seven
variables exhibit significant ARCH errors at least on the 5% significance level which in-
dicates that estimating a VAR model with a time-varying covariance-variance structure
seems to be appropriate.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
2.1 TVP-VAR-based Connectedness Approach
As mentioned previously the summary statistics imply that a VAR model with a time-
varying variance-covariance matrix would be adequate. In addition, we assume that the
1The data is available for download from: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/HKKS_Monthly.
html and http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html for Greece and Europe, respec-
tively.
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relationship across the transformed uncertainty indices is varying with time. Thus, the
propagation mechanism estimated by the connectedness approach of (Diebold and Yılmaz,
2014) will rest on a TVP-VAR model as outlined by Antonakakis and Gabauer (2017).
According to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the TVP-VAR model should be
estimated with one lag which can be written as,
yt =Φtyt−1 + ut ut|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,Σt) (1)
vec(Φt) =vec(Φt−1) + ξt ξt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,ΣΦt ) (2)
where Ωt−1 stands for all information available up to t − 1, yt and ut represent m × 1
dimensional vectors and Φt and Σt are m×m dimensional matrices. In addition, ξt and
vec(Φt) are m
2 × 1 dimensional vectors and ΣΦt is an m2 ×m2 dimensional matrix
The connectedness approach developed by Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) rests on gener-
alized impulse response functions (GIRF) and generalized forecast error variance decom-
positions (GFEVD) invented by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). Both
measures are based on the time-varying coefficient and time-varying variance-covariance
matrices retrieved from the TVP-VAR. Thus, we are transforming the TVP-VAR to a
TVP-VMA model using the Wold representation theorem, yt =
∑p
i=1 Φityt−i + ut =∑∞
j=1 Λjtut−j + ut.
Using the GIRF instead of its orthorgonalized version has the main advantage that
the results are not influenced by the variable ordering. With the GIRF, we calculate how
large the impact of a shock in variable i is on all other variables j. Thus, the impact
is computed as the difference of the presence and the absence of a shock in variable i’s
K-step ahead forecast on all other variables j. Hence, the GIRFs (Ψij,t(K)) represent
the K-step ahead forecast dynamics of all variables j following a shock in variable i.










where υi,t is the selection vector with a one on the ith position and zero otherwise.
Afterwards, we compute the GFEVD (ψij,t(K)) that can be interpreted as the forecast
error variance share one variable explains on others. These variance shares are then
5
normalised, so that each row sums up to one, meaning that all variables together explain
















ψij,t(K) = m. (5)
Notably, the diagonal elements are the own-variance share (how much of the forecast error
variance of variable i is explained by its own lagged values) and the off diagonal elements
(how much of the forecast error variance of variable i is explained by the lagged values of
variable j). Based on the GFEVD, we compute all other relevant connectedness measures
in five steps to complete the connectedness table.
Step I: We are interested in the impact variable i has on all other variables j. This is






Step II: We reverse the concept and compute the impact all variables j have on variable







Step III: We subtract equation (6) from (7) to obtain the net total directional connected-
ness measures, which represent the dominance of variable i on the whole network.
Γi,t(K) = Γi→j,t(K)− Γi←j,t(K) (8)
A positive (negative) value illustrates that variable i is driving the network more (less)
than being driven by it. Hence, variable i is a net transmitter (receiver).
Step IV: The net total directional connectedness is broken down to the bilateral level to
get further insights in the underlying bidirectional dynamics. The bidirectional dynamics
are called net pairwise directional connectedness (NPDC) and can be computed as follows,
NPDCij(K) = ψjit(K)− ψijt(K).
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Step V: Finally, we compute the interconnectedness of the network using the adjusted
total connectedness index (TCI) of Gabauer (2018) which lies within [0,1] if K → ∞.






The lower (higher) the TCI the less (more) the network is interconnected. Moreover, a
high value is usually associated with a risky network since a shock in one variable will
influence other variables substantially. On the opposite, a low TCI indicates that every
variable is only influenced by its own lagged values.
Since we want to examine the country-internal and external uncertainty transmission
processes we are applying the connectedness decomposition approach of Gabauer and
Gupta (2018). First, the connectedness table is rewritten in k partitions, each partition
representing one country:
ψ(K) = [ψ]ij,t(K) =

D11 D12 . . . D1k





Dk1 Dk2 . . . Dkk

where Dii represents the internal connectedness of country i and Dij represents the con-
nectedness from country j to country i. Moreover, for computing internal and external





















where TOij, FROMij and NETij are corresponding to the previous interpretations but
on the country-level and EXij is the net international connectedness or net external
connectedness.
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where ρ is a set of all variables associated with country κ.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Dynamic Connectedness Table
In Table 2, we report the averages of the dynamic connectedness measures based on
the TVP-VAR methodology. Since the TCI is equal to 65.8% – this means that on
average 65.8% of a shock in one variable is transmitted to all others – the analyzed
network seems to be highly interconnecteed. Out of the 65.8%, 41.9% of the spillovers
are Greece-internal ones whereas 23.9% of the spillovers are caused by Europe. In other
wordes, approximately one-fourth of the entire network spillovers can be accounted to the
international spillovers between Greece and Europe. This measure already indicates that
there is a high bidirectional relationship across Greece and Europe which we would have
expected in the first place.
We observe that spillovers of different types of uncertainty in Greece had greater in-
fluence on European economic policy uncertainty than vice-versa, with Greek banking
uncertainty (related to the capital controls imposed in Greece in June 2015 in an attempt
to avoid an uncontrolled bank run) and currency uncertainty (e.g. rumours about poten-
tial Grexit and adoption of a ‘new Drachma’) being at the epicenter of the transmission
of uncertainty both within Greece and between Greece and Europe. These results are
also supported by the estimated net directional connectedness measures. Specifically,
within Greece, banking, currency, and monetary policy uncertainty are net transmitters
of shocks, while debt, tax, and pension uncertainty are net receivers. Overall, uncertainty
indices related to monetary policy (EPUC, EPUB and EPUM) seem to be internal net
transmitters whereas those related to fiscal policy (EPUD, EPUT and EPUP) are internal
net receiver of shocks.
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If we account for European economic policy uncertainty too, we observe that the Greek
monetary policy uncertainty becomes a net receiver of shocks, while European economic
policy uncertainty along with the remaining Greek subcategories of uncertainty are net
receivers of shocks. This means that Greece has a larger influence on Europe than Europe
has on Greece in terms of uncertainty.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
3.2 Dynamic Total Connectedness and Market Risk
Since the static TCI indicators are masking the underyling dynamics we continue with
the dynamic total connectedness indices. Figure 3 illustrates time-variation of the overall
TCI, the Greece-internal TCI and the external TCI. According to this figure, we observe
that the value of the overall TCI fluctuates over time within a broad range, spanning
approximately between 55% and 85% which in addition is also responsive to extreme
economic events. In particular, the first peak can be observed around 2003-2004 when
Greece admits fudging the euro entry and that the Greek budget deficit has never been
below 3% since 1999. The next peak can be observed during the Global Financial Crisis
when Greece got downgraded because of its unsustainable high debts. In addition, the
Greek government expected an increase in its deficit by around 9% only in 2009. The third
peak at the beginning of 2010 can be assigned to the fact that Greece failed to pursue the
financial markets to be able to cut its debts. Furthermore, the IMF and Europe granted
the first bailout package.
Interestingly, the international TCI jumps twice to a higher level, (i) when it came
to light that Greece manipulated data to enter the Eurozone, and (ii) when the Global
Financial Crisis hit the European economy. However, it seems that the international TCI
comes back to its initial level during 2015 whereas the Greek internal TCI increased which
may have been caused by the Greek bailout referendum and the capital controls in the
summer of 2015. The last peak in mid-2016 can be assigned to the Brexit votum which
increased the uncertainty in the European market.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
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3.3 Net Dynamic Connectedness
Turning our attention to the interpretation of the dynamic net directional connectedness
plots further strengthens our findings. According to Figure 4, Greek banking and currency
policy uncertainty are the main net transmitters of shocks throughout the sample, with
the later reaching peaks during the beginning of 2010. These peaks can be associated
with the concerns related to a Grexit scenario and the introduction of a ’new Drachma’.
Noteworthy is that in mid-2012 there is a sharp decline which could be linked to Draghi’s
“Whatever it takes”-speech which calmed financial market uncertainty. Nevertheless, the
trend that currency uncertainty is a net transmitter seems to constantly increase which
could signal upcoming fears that the European currency union is not as stable as it ought
be. Furthermore, one peak in mid-2015 can be observed which could mark the Greek
bailout referendum that increased uncertainty in financial markets since the majority of
the Greek voters declined the bailout conditions of the IMF, the ECB, and the European
commission (EC).
The three main net receivers of the Greek categorical uncertainty measures are pension,
taxes and debt uncertainty. All three became substantial net receiver after the Gobal
Financial Crisis occurred. This can be explained by the fiscal austerity program which
was imposed on Greece to reduce its budget deficits and debts. It included, among others,
a freeze in the salaries of all governmental employees, cuts in bonuses, overtime workers,
and work-related travel expenses, in addition to the increased value-added-taxes.
Finally, and most importantly, Figure 4 also indicates that the European economic
policy uncertainty is driven by the Greek uncertainty indices. Notably, the European
economic policy uncertainty reaches three lows, (i) during the Global Financial Crisis,
(ii) during the European governmental debt crisis, and (i) in 2015 which was marked by
capital controls and the Greek bailout referendum.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
3.4 Internal and External Net Directional Connectedness
Figure 5 and Figure 6 represent the external and internal NPDC measures, respectively,
which strengthen our previous findings. Specifically, Figure 5 indicates that banking, cur-
rency, debt and monetary policy uncertainties are driving the European economic policy
uncertainty, while the Greek pension and tax uncertainty is driven by European economic
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policy uncertainty. Since currency and banking policy highly depend on monetary policy,
we argue that monetary policy related uncertainty indices seem to substantially influence
the European economic policy uncertainty.
By contrast, Greek tax and pension uncertainty are dominated by the European eco-
nomic policy uncertainty which can be related to the fiscal austerity program imposed on
Greece. Both uncertainties belong to fiscal policy related uncertainties. The third fiscal
policy related uncertainty, debt uncertainty, is driving the European economic policy un-
certainty since it is threatening the stability of the Eurozone according to the Maastricht
criteria. However, it seems that at the beginning of 2016, Europe managed to deal ap-
propriately with the Greek budget deficit and started to influence debt more than being
influenced by it.
The increase in the net transmission of the Greek banking and currency uncertainty
in mid-2015 can be explained by the fact that financial markets feared the outcome of
the Greek bailout referendum, whereas the subsequent decline in both values can be as-
sociated with how Europe dealed with the outcome. Noteworthy is that the largest net
transmission comes from the Greek currency uncertainty right after the start of the Eu-
ropean governmental debt crisis which initially raised the question whether the European
monetary union can survive the aftermath the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, we want
to refer to the net transmission power of the Greek debt uncertainty which is telling a very
detailed story. It increased in its power when rumours about the Greek data manipulation
incident occurred and started decreasing after the Global Financial Crisis went viral. The
bailout packages reduced its power to a low level, from which it started to increase again
until Greece requested another bailout aid in 2015.
The internal net directional connectedness measures shown in Figure 6 reveal the
dominance of Greek currency, banking and, to some extent, monetary policy uncertainty
in the Greece-internal transmission process. Note that tax, debt, and pension uncertainty
indices (and hence fiscal policy uncertainty in general) are permanently net receivers of
shocks. This implies that monetary policy related uncertainties dominate fiscal policy
related uncertainties which is in-line with the results of Gabauer and Gupta (2018).
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 around here]
Finally, Figure 7 shows that the Greek economic policy uncertainty mainly dominates
the European economic policy uncertainty throughout the analyzed sample. Three peaks
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can be observed, (i) during the subprime market crisis which substantially influenced the
Greek debts via defaulted collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities,
(ii) the start of the European governmental debt crisis and (iii) at the beginning of 2015
when Greece requested another bailout package.
[Insert Figure 7 around here]
3.5 The Persistence of Uncertainty Shocks
Last but not least, the generalized impulse responses presented in Figure 8 indicate that
Greek currency, banking and monetary policy shocks had a long-lasting impact (at least
six months) both internally and externally. During the Global Financial Crisis and the
European governmental debt crisis, it can be noted that the GIRF are substantially
higher in magnitude and persistence than before the Global Financial Crisis. This further
indicates that Greek banking, currency, and monetary policy uncertainty shocks have
strongly shaped the European economic policy uncertainty during and after the Global
Financial Crisis.
[Insert Figure 8 around here]
4 Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether and which subcategories of Greek economic policy
uncertainty caused changes in European economic policy uncertainty and vice versa. In
more detail, our results reveal that the Greek economic policy uncertainty is – throughout
the period of analysis – a net transmitter of shocks with respect to the European economic
policy uncertainty.
Specifically, the Greek banking, currency, monetary and debt policy uncertainty have
been identified as the main net transmitters of shocks with respect to the European
economic policy uncertainty. This could be explained by several factors, such as the
Greek data manipulation incident, Grexit rumours, the Greek bailout referendum, and
capital controls. On the opposite, the European economic policy uncertainty is dominating
the Greek tax and pension uncertainty. This could be explained by the fiscal austerity
program which was imposed on Greece in order to receive financial support. Greece-
internal spillovers have illustrated that fiscal policy related uncertainties are dominated
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by monetary policy related uncertainties. This result supports the finding of Gabauer and
Gupta (2018). Finally, the GIRFs have shown that the uncertainty spillovers increased
significantly in magnitude and persistence during times of economic turmoil which in turn
prolonged the economic recovery in Europe as well.
From a policy perspective, given that the monetary and currency policies cannot be
flexible for Greece with it being part of the Eurozone, changes need to be carried out
in the banking sector and how government government debt is managed. In this regard,
Piketty (2019) has suggested the need for a conference on all of Europe’s debts, just like
after World War II. He suggested that a restructuring of all debt, not just in Greece but in
several European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland), is required. Further real-
izing that the ability to pay its debts depends greatly on the amount of tax the government
is able to collect, tax reform measures and corruption leading to tax evasion also needs to
be tackled, given Greece’s high tax evasion rates. Finally, as highlighted by Stournaras
(2018), enhanced supervisory framework needs to be developed and implemented in a
rigorous manner for the management of non-performing exposures for banks. In essence
strong supervisin of the banking structure and continuous fiscal austerity measures for
long spans are required to put Greece on track, and prevent uncertainty spillovers to the
other European economies.
In the wake of the recent US-China trade war, a similar study can be conducted,
whereby one could analyze the impact of trade related uncertainties in US and China
(as also developed by Baker et al. (2016), and Davis et al. (2019) ) on general economic
uncertainty of other major developed and developing economies. An additional avenue,
that we leave for future research is to investigate whether the aforementioned spillovers
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Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N., and Swagel, P. (1996). Political Instability And
Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2):189–211.
Anscombe, F. J. and Glynn, W. J. (1983). Distribution Of The Kurtosis Statistic B2 For
Normal Samples. Biometrika, 70(1):227–234.
Antonakakis, N. and Gabauer, D. (2017). Refined Measures Of Dynamic Connectedness
Based On TVP-VAR. Technical report, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Antonakakis, N., Gabauer, D., Gupta, R., and Plakandaras, V. (2018). Dynamic Con-
nectedness Of Uncertainty Across Developed Economies: A Time-Varying Approach.
Economics Letters, 166:63–75.
Apergis, N. and Cooray, A. (2014). Convergence In Sovereign Debt Ratios Across Heavily
Indebted EU Countries: Evidence From Club Convergence. Applied Economics Letters,
21(11):786–788.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4):1593–1636.
Biljanovska, N., Grigoli, F., and Hengge, M. (2017). Fear Thy Neighbor: Spillovers From
Economic Policy Uncertainty. IMF Working Papers 17/240, International Monetary
Fund.
Caggiano, G., Castelnuovo, E., and Figueres, J. M. (2017). Economic Policy Uncertainty
Spillovers In Booms And Busts. Technical report, CESifo Group Munich.
Castelnuovo, E., Lim, G., and Pellegrino, G. (2017). A Short Review Of The Recent
Literature On Uncertainty. Australian Economic Review, 50(1):68–78.
Chen, B. and Feng, Y. (1996). Some Political Determinants Of Economic Growth: Theory
And Empirical Implications. European Journal of Political Economy, 12(4):609–627.
Colombo, V. (2013). Economic Policy Uncertainty In The US: Does It Matter For The
Euro Area? Economics Letters, 121(1):39–42.
D’Agostino, R. B. (1970). Transformation To Normality Of The Null Distribution Of G1.
Biometrika, 57(3):679–681.
Davis, S., Liu, D., and Sheng, X. (2019). Economic Policy Uncertainty In China Since
1949: The View From Mainland Newspapers. Technical report.
De Santis, R. A., Zimic, S., et al. (2018). Spillovers Among Sovereign Debt Markets: Iden-
tification Through Absolute Magnitude Restrictions. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
33(5):727–747.
Diebold, F. X. and Yılmaz, K. (2012). Better To Give Than To Receive: Predictive
Directional Measurement Of Volatility Spillovers. International Journal of Forecasting,
28(1):57–66.
Diebold, F. X. and Yılmaz, K. (2014). On The Network Topology Of Variance Decompo-
sitions: Measuring The Connectedness Of Financial Firms. Journal of Econometrics,
182(1):119–134.
Elliott, G., Rothenberg, T. J., and Stock, J. (1996). Efficient Tests For An Autoregressive
Unit Root. Econometrica, 64(4):813–36.
Gabauer, D. (2018). ’To Be Or Not To Be’ A Member Of An Optimum Currency Area?
New Evidence From The ERM I Period. Technical report.
14
Gabauer, D. and Gupta, R. (2018). On The Transmission Mechanism Of Country-Specific
And International Economic Uncertainty Spillovers: Evidence From A TVP-VAR Con-
nectedness Decomposition Approach. Economics Letters, 171:63–71.
Gupta, R., Lau, C. K. M., and Wohar, M. E. (2019). The Impact Of US Uncertainty On
The Euro Area In Good And Bad Times: Evidence From A Quantile Structural Vector
Autoregressive Model. Empirica, 46(2):353–368.
Gupta, R., Ma, J., Risse, M., and Wohar, M. E. (2018). Common Business Cycles And
Volatilities In US States And MSAs: The Role Of Economic Uncertainty. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 57:317–337.
Hardouvelis, G. A., Karalas, G., Karanastasis, D., and Samartzis, P. (2018). Economic
Policy Uncertainty, Political Uncertainty And The Greek Economic Crisis. Technical
report.
Jarque, C. M. and Bera, A. K. (1980). Efficient Tests For Normality, Homoscedasticity
And Serial Independence Of Regression Residuals. Economics Letters, 6(3):255–259.
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2009). On The Measurement Of Political Instability And Its Impact On
Economic Growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1):15–29.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
EEPU EPUC EPUB EPUD EPUT EPUM EPUP
Mean 0.118 0.152 0.087 0.232 0.09 0.128 0.177
Variance 0.225 0.581 0.267 1.25 0.215 0.503 0.458
Skewness 1.253∗∗∗ 2.228∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 5.886∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗ 1.284∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kurtosis 2.048∗∗∗ 7.919∗∗∗ 3.077∗∗∗ 46.332∗∗∗ 5.928∗∗∗ 5.415∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
JB 101.639∗∗∗ 801.608∗∗∗ 174.770∗∗∗ 22185.650∗∗∗ 454.434∗∗∗ 445.985∗∗∗ 86.998∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ERS -3.462∗∗∗ -4.676∗∗∗ -3.970∗∗∗ -5.400∗∗∗ -5.772∗∗∗ -5.719∗∗∗ -4.869∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q(5) 192.747∗∗∗ 175.783∗∗∗ 110.927∗∗∗ 31.061∗∗∗ 35.894∗∗∗ 55.147∗∗∗ 49.884∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q2(5). 46.003∗∗∗ 19.053∗∗∗ 44.972∗∗∗ 0.792 6.300 2.545 11.538∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.978) (0.278) (0.770) (0.042)
Unconditional Correlations
EEPU EPUC EPUB EPUD EPUT EPUM EPUP
EEPU 1.000 0.417 0.508 0.370 0.359 0.366 0.248
EPUC 0.417 1.000 0.683 0.516 0.417 0.393 0.370
EPUB 0.508 0.683 1.000 0.497 0.475 0.563 0.484
EPUD 0.370 0.516 0.497 1.000 0.510 0.429 0.331
EPUT 0.359 0.417 0.475 0.510 1.000 0.319 0.362
EPUM 0.366 0.393 0.563 0.429 0.319 1.000 0.177
EPUP 0.248 0.370 0.484 0.331 0.362 0.177 1.000
Notes: ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; Skewness: D’Agostino (1970) test; Kurtosis:
Anscombe and Glynn (1983) test; JB: Jarque and Bera (1980) normality test; ERS: Elliott et al. (1996) unit-root test; Q(5)
and Q2(5): Ljung and Box (1978) portmanteau test. EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy,
EPUC = Currency Policy, EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary
Policy Uncertainty.
Table 2: Dynamic Connectedness Table
EEPU EPUC EPUB EPUD EPUT EPUM EPUP FROMi FROM
EEPU 45.5 12.4 14.6 10.0 5.5 8.9 3.2 54.5
EPUC 9.8 41.3 17.6 10.1 5.5 10.2 5.4 48.9 58.7
EPUB 10.6 18.6 33.5 9.3 7.2 13.5 7.5 56.0 66.5
EPUD 7.5 14.1 11.9 39.0 11.3 10.0 6.1 53.5 61.0
EPUT 7.2 9.6 10.5 12.4 46.2 7.5 6.6 46.6 53.8
EPUM 7.6 10.4 18.4 8.9 4.7 47.5 2.5 44.9 52.5
EPUP 4.6 12.0 13.9 7.2 7.0 3.3 52.0 43.4 48.0
TOi 64.7 72.3 47.8 35.8 44.6 28.1 TCIi TCIx
NETi 15.8 16.3 -5.7 -10.8 -0.3 -15.3 41.9 23.9
TO 47.2 77.1 86.9 57.8 41.3 53.5 31.3 TCI
NET -7.3 18.4 20.4 -3.2 -12.5 1.0 -16.7 65.8
NPSO 2.0 6.0 5.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 0.0
Notes: Values reported are variance decomposition shares for estimated TVP-VAR model with a lag length of order 1
according to the BIC. The variance decompositions are based on 12-step-ahead forecasts. Light grey highlighted cells
indicate connectedness within Greece, while dark grey highlighted ones denote connectedness between Greece and Europe.
EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy, EPUT = Tax Policy,
EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Raw Series
Notes: EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy,
EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
Figure 2: Annual Percentage Changes
Notes: EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy,
EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Total Connectedness
Notes: The light grey shaded area illustrates the TCI with external spillovers, while the dark grey area illustrates the TCI
without external spillovers, and the black shaded area illustrates the international TCI.
Figure 4: Net Total Directional Connectedness
Notes: The black shaded area illustrates connectedness with external spillovers, whereas the grey line illustrates the
internal spillovers. EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy,
EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
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Figure 5: External Net Pairwise Directional Connectedness
Notes: EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy,
EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
Figure 6: Internal Net Pairwise Directional Connectedness
Notes: EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy,
EPUT = Tax Policy, EPUD = Debt Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
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Figure 7: Net External Connectedness
Notes: The light-grey shaded area illustrates dynamic international spillovers from Greece to Europe, the dark-grey shaded
area shows dynamic international spillovers from Europe to Greece and the black area represents net international
spillovers from Europe to Greece.
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Figure 8: Generalized Impulse Responses
Notes: EEPU = European Economic Policy, EPUB = Banking Policy, EPUC = Currency Policy, EPUP = Pension Policy
and EPUM = Monetary Policy Uncertainty.
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A.1 Appendix
The TVP-VAR which is applied in this study can be represented as follows,
yt =Φtyt−1 + εt εt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,Σt)
vec(Φt) =vec(Φt−1) + ξt ξt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0,ΣΦt )
For the initialization of the Kalman, we are using an empirical Bayes prior, where the
parameters vec(Φ0) and Σ0, are set equal to the estimation results of a constant parameter
VAR based on the first 100 months.
vec(Φ0) ∼N(vec(ΦOLS),ΣΦOLS)
Σ0 =ΣOLS.
The Kalman Filter estimation relies on forgetting factors (0 ≤ κi ≤ 1) which regulates
how fast the parameters are varying over time. Based on the sensitivty analysis of Koop
and Korobilis (2014), we set κi equal to 0.99
2 and start with:
vec(Φt)|y1:t−1 ∼N(vec(Φt|t−1),ΣΦt|t−1)
vec(Φt|t−1) =vec(Φt−1|t−1)





Σt =κ1Σt−1|t−1 + (1− κ1)ε̂′tε̂t
vec(Φt) and Σ
Φ
t are updated by
vec(Φt)|y1:t ∼N(vec(Φt|t),ΣΦt|t)
























Finally, we update the variance-covariance matrix, Σt, by:
ε̂t|t =yt −Φt|tyt−1
Σt|t =κ1Σt−1|t−1 + (1− κ1)ε̂′t|tε̂t|t
2Even tough we could allow the forgetting factors to vary over time we have chosen to fix it to a
constant value. The main reasons are retrieved from Koop and Korobilis (2013) who argue that the
value added to the forecasting performance is questionable and that computation burden is increased
significantly.
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